The paper builds on recent research that challenges common political assessments of 
Introduction
Analysis of Cambodian and Vietnamese politics since their re-emergence to integration into global markets has not until recently tended to the comparative. The countries are usually viewed as very different, with dissimilar histories, political cultures and social norms.
1 Three recent provocative studies, however, suggest the value of comparison, driven by arguments that challenge common views.
The literature on Vietnam, generally and widely seen as politically stable, with a developmentally-focused ruling Communist Party, has very often attributed success to a combination of good policy, political stability and various contextual factors such as a hardworking population and ready participation in powerful Asian growth processes. Martin
Gainsborough, however, in a tightly-argued article, denies any links between political action there and policy differences; rather, politics is all about the division of spoils [Gainsborough 2007 ]. By contrast, Cambodia has generally been seen as a country that has failed any reasonable test of political development, mired in corruption and deeply authoritarian. Yet, bearing in mind her rapid economic growth over the past decade or so, analysts are starting to develop arguments that Cambodia's polity is both stable and increasingly capable of supporting continued economic growth [Scopis 2012] 2 . Rhetorically, Vietnam is allegedly a 'land without a king', whilst Cambodia is not. 3 Landau, in an overtly comparative study, contrasts the situation in the two countries. In
Cambodia, she sees a clear "legally protected realm for civil society and where there are clear contestations and clashes between competing ideologies and interest groups over the nature and boundaries of the Cambodian state". However, in Vietnam she observes a situation "where the boundaries between state and society are associatively, as well as conceptually, ill-defined and elusive and the most important contestations often occur within the state " [Landau 2007 ].
Such views link to wider discussions of the possibilities (and limitations) of such phenomena as 'authoritarian consolidation' (see for example Goebel 2011) where elites may obtain a 1 In the 1980s various academic conferences looked at 'Indochina', linking Laos, Vietnam and Cambodia through their common communist regimes, albeit that these were very different, but since then comparison has been very limited. 2 See Scopis 2012 chapter 3 for a discussion of the emerging literature discussing Cambodia's apparent political stability. 3 This was put to me in 2010 by a Saigonese businessman with experience in Cambodia.
broader and less costly range of options to address political challenges by governing through regulation and the management of discourse rather than through coercion [Goebel 2011:1] .
Since the early 1990s both countries have seen major interventions by Western donors. As
China has become more powerful her presence has increasingly been felt in the region.
Western influence is an important issue, and one amongst a range of forces driving and explaining donor activities.
The lines of argument presented by the studies mentioned above engage with two important analytical issues.
First is the question of the correct analytical positioning of international support for civil society in both countries. By arguing that references to the 'state' should, when conceptually clarified, include such political activities (by donors) this allows for a far better understanding of the effects of quite different strategic engagements by donors in the two countries. To simplify, Cambodia saw a donor engagement strategy that supported (materially and in terms of attention) emergence of Landau's "legally protected realm", whilst Vietnam did not. Rhetorically, had the equivalent of the tens of millions of dollars spent by donors on
Cambodian local NGOs and their embryonic equivalents been spent in Vietnam, things would have by now been very different. Although this paper does not address the question as to why these two trajectories were so different, this does not appear in any sense to have been necessary, rather the outcome of donor strategy and various personal career decisions in both countries.
Second is the question of sovereignty. In this paper this question -the question of sovereignty -is understood as the issue of the presence (or otherwise), and its nature, of an idealized 'authority above all others' within these countries' polities to which society and state may refer. This paper develops a line of argument that links discussion of civil society to ideas about sovereignty in the work of Hinsley. This permits an argument that analytically the weakness of civil society in Vietnam should be necessarily linked to the weakness of state agency, and vice versa in Cambodia. The comparative perspective is here interesting, not least as the implications of the research mentioned above confounds much standard thinking. Therefore, it is wise to reflect on this issue of sovereignty.
The paper therefore concludes that the strategic direction taken by donors has consequences, that these are important, and that therefore a suitable analytical framework is needed to guide such strategic decisions. This framework should have (and in Vietnam did not) taken fuller account of the effects of support for civil society upon state strength, given that what seems to have happened is that an assumption of state strength was itself overdone, and that lack of social development weakened the possibilities for the development of political authority.
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Analytical issues
Positioning donor activities as part of local politics
The paper argues that the central analytical issue is to secure some clear way of understanding how the politics of civil society (CS) organization may involve (and so can be understood in such terms) participation in political processes, including but not limited to the creation and maintenance of order in their particular context. CS issues should not be separated from the big political picture, and that picture should not assume that apparent political order reflects fundamental political stability. There is in the case of Vietnam a substantial literature arguing that the successful transition from plan to market was not the result of conscious policy at all [de Vylder and Fforde 1996 and 1997] . Conversely, the equivalent literature on Cambodia has found it extremely hard to accept that, despite apparent policy weaknesses, economic growth since the early 'noughties' could have been as fast as it has been. 5 At the core of these tangles is the question of agency, and the extent to which there is a state that is 'doing development'.
Here the tension between realist and constructivist approaches mirrors issues in the practicalities of donor intervention. So we find different understandings, of course, of how the term 'political' should be used, and also what it is taken to mean. Thus, CS organisation often involves activities that may be labelled political, both analytically and politically, and so arguably involved with the business of 'the state', but at the same time, using commonly accepted empirics, are rather easily said not to be part of 'the state'. This may give donors room for manoeuvre under trying conditions. Thus, one might say, they are political without being political, which may well be tactically useful, or constraining, or something else entirely.
Thus, this being about politics, such frameworks are illuminated by the warning of Dunn Each of these two conceptions (the state as sociological fact and the state as normative political proposal) must relate in some way to most of the entities which we now call states, but neither makes quite clear how to apply it in practice. [Dunn 2000:69] Coping with analytical frameworks that should be able to illuminate these issues requires some deeper understanding of how these frameworks do what they do. Problems here stem to a large degree from tensions created by the ways in which contestation over various important terms (especially 'state' and 'power') blur boundaries that are -this blurring notwithstanding -of considerable importance to many actors (both political actors and analysts). Central here are three questions:
How does one address the empirical issues associated with attempts to use the term CS in trying to understand politics in the two countries?
A good reason for this is that the term CS is used within a complex debate in different ways, and that this suggests that it is an 'essentially contested concept' with meaning close to that offered by the inventor of the term 'essentially contested concept' [Gallie 1956 , also Kekes 1977 . Whilst many analyses argue that they themselves are 'right', and others 'wrong', an important suggestion made by Gallie is that such differences should not necessarily be taken as indicative, of themselves, that one or more parties in the debate are being unreasonable.
As the paper discusses further below, this allows for a perspective on analytical frameworks that copes with the familiar combination of shared terms and contested meanings. The paper argues that analyses of CS activity may usefully be seen as revealing how CS activities are useful indicators of politics and political activity.
In addition, a closely related final question:
How does one cope analytically with pressures to treat civil society as a definable realm,
linked to debates about its autonomous (or not) character in any particular instance?
This, arguably, is illuminated by the treatment of CS as an 'essentially contested concept', allowing us to appreciate how such pressures (and their opposition) may be seen politically.
In discussing analytical frameworks for understanding the politics of CS organization, we may also draw upon the idea, valid in both countries, that important political actors have been thinking about CS and its wider implications strategically. 
CS politics and the issue of sovereignty
From Hinsley we may take the idea that political communities historically (and so to a certain extent necessarily) come to the belief that there should be domestic sovereignty through tensions in the debates about relations between those who are governed and those who govern. Here precisely the value of the CS debate in both countries is that, in different 6 See Wischermann 2010 arguing that it is less confusing to treat CS as the certain characteristics of action, rather than as a discrete 'realm'. 7 As a consultant, working in the sector in the late 'noughties', it was clearly to me that views within the VCP were organizations such as School Councils, if actively democratic, would threaten Party rule precisely in that they would increase the power of CS. Money (bribes, access to real estate deals etc.) could overcome this, but rather a lot would have been needed, more than was available.
ways, it adds to discussions of their evolving political orders by, as is central to such debates, injecting into politics important issues that engage powerfully with questions of relations between governed and government whilst posing sharp questions about the effectiveness of state power.
Here the 'developmental' agenda can be seen having powerful discursive effects, both potentially and actually, since this agenda place policy to the fore. It is policy that is argued to be crucial to the success or failure of national development, and policy requires the firm exercise of domestic sovereignty.
Donors are therefore deeply unhappy when there appears to be a 'failed state', or some other situation where domestic sovereignty, the prerequisite for policy in the classic sense 'deciding what will be done', and also not only a second dimension to do with 'deciding what will not be part of the agenda', but also that third dimension that pulls the whole thing up by its bootstraps, to do with 'deciding what may be thought doable'.
The value of comparison: Vietnam and Cambodia
Across a number of dimensions, in the matter of the politics of civil society organization the two countries appear as diametric opposites: though perhaps, like some siblings, this may be precisely how similar issues rub antagonistically together to provoke useful reflections on similarities. Certainly, of all the generalizations found in the unhappy world of nationalisms, frequent Cambodian dislike of 'the Vietnamese', and a not uncommon Vietnamese sense of somewhat puzzled confusion at how people could be quite so 'ungrateful', are matters familiar to many of us when we think of ourselves in common sense terms rather than as 'analysts'.
First, given the apparently clear developmental thrust of Vietnamese Communism, and the apparently clear architecture of rule associated with its rule, how and why do we find ourselves facing the need to explain arguments of sustained failure to deal with policy problems such as education and health reform, corruption and that tangle of issues commonly associated with transition to and through 'middle income status'? [Fforde 2004; 2012] How can one also cope with arguments that whilst these issues may point analyses to consider whether fundamental issues confront Vietnamese politics, because they can be construed to amount to a 'crisis of authority', the reverse may appear from It is the politics of CS organization that is crucial, although perhaps neither agreed nor obvious exactly why. To understand this we need to include donor activities when we think about policy and political development: in a naïve sense, this makes them part of the local state, in a proper analytical sense, though this has for obvious political reason to be denied
(not least to maintain the charade of external sovereignty). We also need to consider the interactions between society and government that Hinsley's approach to sovereignty place centrally.
Let us return now to a discussion of ways one may use CS as an 'essentially contested concept'. This makes it easier to understand the political space open to donors and others intervening in ways that may be related to CS.
Civil society as an 'essentially contested concept'
Just as the phrase 'multiple truths' reveals much about the field of contest, so the notion of 'essentially contested concepts' is itself useful to understanding what is going on. As we shall see, this alludes to, and so need not necessarily directly engage with, matters of power as well as of overt political action. This is of obvious utility in a wide variety of situations. Gallie (1956) presents his argument in terms that suggest necessity; that is, his discussion of various concepts implies that they have some essential meaning. We do not need to get too hung up about this, treating his ideas as contextual when we want to. He suggests, and these proposals seem usefully applied to the CS debate, that some terms qua concepts have the following characteristics [Gallie 1956 : 171 et seq] and so are 'essentially contested':
First -"appraisive in the sense that it signifies or accredits some kind of valued achievement"
[171]. It seems quite clear that CS is generally, whether overtly or not, used in such ways, which is of course part of its power and attractiveness. Thus:
Witness the tragedy that has befallen the proponents of the concept: people struggling against authoritarian regimes had demanded civil society; what they got instead was NGOs! [Chandhoke 2007:608] Second, "This achievement must be of an internally complex character, for all that its worth is attributed to it as a whole" [171-2]. It seems quite clear that references to CS in the literature differ with reference to assertions and discussions that platform on the idea that CS, and its contexts, are complex. One thinks here of the different elements said to make up CS 'action' (Wischermann 2010; this volume) , discussions of the meanings of 'relative autonomy', and so on.
Third, thus, "the accredited achievement is initially variously describable" [172] . Here Gallie appears to be asserting that for him a crucial aspect of an ECC is that there are no great pressures to force agreement on one particular way of describing how the internal complexity of the concept should be dealt with. Contestation, thus, happens.
Fourth, "The accredited achievement must be of a kind that admits of considerable modification … {that} cannot be predicted in advance" [172] . Is this sense, contestation thus not only happens, but can continue. Does anybody expect the CS debate to stop?
To these four points Gallie adds three more:
His fifth adds to the idea that there is a social contestation: "… to use an essentially concept means to use it against other uses and to recognize that one's use of it has to be maintained against these other uses ... both aggressively and defensively." [172] Finally, to tighten up his position, Gallie adds two final conditions "to distinguish the … concept from the kind of concept that can be shown to be … radically confused" [180] . These are, first, "the derivation of any such concept from an original exemplar whose authority is acknowledged by all the contestant users of the concept" and, second, "the probability or plausibility … of the claim that the continuous competition for acknowledgement as between the contestant users of the concept, enables the original exemplar's achievement to be sustained and/or developed …" [180] .
Noting that definitions of the exemplar may also be contested, this seems to make sense in the context of the CS debate, lurking behind many elements of which are shared (often somewhat vaguely) narratives of various events, especially those in Eastern Europe in the 1970s and 1980s [Chandhoke 2007 ].
Gallie was writing in the 1950s, when essentialist argument had far greater authority than nowadays, at least in scholarly debate. However, his points are useful when assessing assertions that there is (and that this should be accepted) a true definition of CS. Rather, we can see such assertions in other ways, especially the political. In turn, this allows us to reexamine crucial claims made in the comparative histories of donor engagement under CS headings in Cambodia and Vietnam. A common reason given by donors in Vietnam in the 1990s for not putting more resources into emergent local CS activity combined arguments that 'they were not really independent' with a sense that the Party was ruling effectively and policy mattered -the former view was politically inept, the latter highly contestable.
9
An early reference to the idea of contested space can be found in Fforde and Porter 1995.
We favour {an} approach which starts from the assumption that the elusiveness of the boundary is a clue to the nature of the phenomenon. In this view, the distinction between the state and civil society is not best understood as a boundary between and around or external to two distinct entities. Rather, in understanding recent historical events in Vietnam, as well as current possibilities, we think it more useful to focus on `zones of contest' which develop internally within the network of institutional mechanisms through which social and economic order is maintained [Fforde and Porter 1994:5] One can note here that the authors do not state any need a priori to say much about such Mitchell's already-mentioned contribution to the literature on 'the state' is useful [Mitchell 1991] . He argues that the boundary between state and society, as observed, is usually blurred, suggesting that 'states' as observed are an effect of more powerful logics, which he calls certain 'techniques of rule'.
The state needs to be analyzed as … a structural effect. That is to say, it should be examined not as an actual structure, but as the powerful metaphysical effect of practices that make such structures appear to exist … [Mitchell 1991:94] Bearing this in mind, consider the debates about the 'relative autonomy' of the state that offered a platform to the rediscovery of the state -the 'bringing the state back in' that was well argued by Skocpol, though many of these ideas have long histories [Skocpol 1979; also Mann 1984 , and (usefully) a review by Almond (Almond 1988 ) that includes a discussion of why many had earlier abandoned use of the concept]. Central to these views is the belief that understanding political change requires proper analysis of the ways a state may deploy particular sorts of power largely unavailable to other actors. This gives her a way of thinking where a state has a 'relative autonomy' from other political forces. She argues that the state is not an 'arena', and that positions within it therefore offer the possibility of using those powers specific to those positions. For her, these stem from the idea that the state is no mere arena:
It is, rather, a set of administrative, policing and military organizations headed by, and more or less well coordinated by, an executive authority [Skocpol 1979:29] .
Thus
The state normally performs two basic functions: it maintains order, and it competes with other actual or potential states [30] Given this, one of her intentions is to ensure that analyses pay enough attention to groups as questionable, then this is an obvious candidate with a political analysis seeking to identify pressures for change. It also may encourage reflection on the domestic sovereignty that has already been mentioned.
As a caveat, note how Hindess argues that it is unwise to use the term as though power
were some addable quality, so that one may predict outcomes from a calculation of which side has 'the more power':
Once the exercise of power is seen as involving the use of definite resources under conditions that are not entirely determined by the persons concerned, then it ceases to be a capacity to secure one's preferred objectives. Instead, and at best, it becomes a capacity to act in pursuit of those objectives.…
In view of its glaring deficiencies the most interesting question raised by the quantitative conception of power is why it is that so many students of power have been able to take it seriously. At the risk of vast simplification, the choice here pivots on the analysts' view of the necessary nature (or otherwise) of their own analysis. The more necessary the analytical framework is asserted to be, the harder it is to manage questions of choice. This is clear in discussions of interests, especially of those thought to be weak and relatively powerless, for if people apparently do not act in accordance with what the analysis asserts their interests to be, there is a need for some variant of 'false consciousness' to be introduced, by the analyst, into the analysis. 12 A priori there is probably no need to come down on one side or the other of this debate; it is probably healthier to consider this an empirical issue. Analysis 
Sovereignty, relations between rulers and governed, and the issue of sovereignty
Much of the CS debate is closely involved with, if not well within, developmentalist thinking and practices. As already mentioned, these tend to take a somewhat mechanistic view of change processes, largely as they involve the management and conceptualisation of the delivery or resources to seek pre-definable (or at least knowable) outcomes. Development is thus 'done', is transitive, and therefore tends to give high importance to establishing and implementing correct policy as a known means to knowable outcomes [Fforde 2009 ]. Even if
LNGOs and INGOs do not really believe this, in that they secure important resources and authority from international official donors (who may not actually believe it either), they may all need to dance to that tune.
As already mentioned, in discussing Mann's view that the state should be thought of as "a set of administrative, policing and military organizations headed, and more or less well coordinated by, an executive authority", one may ask to what extent it make sense (and when and where) to think in terms of coherent political authority in sovereign terms.
To quote Hinsley:
If we wish to explain why men have thought of power in terms of sovereignty we have but to explain why they have assumed that there was a final and absolute authority in their society -and why they have not always done so … The concept has been formulated when conditions have been emphasizing the interdependence between the political society and the more precise phenomenon of its government. It has been the source of greatest preoccupation and contention when conditions have been producing rapid changes in the scope of government or in the nature of society or in both. It has been resisted or reviled -it could not be overlookedwhen conditions, by producing a close integration between society and government or else by producing a gap between society and government, have inclined men to assume that government and community are identical or else to insist that they ought to be. 
Reflections
It may strike the reader that the paper has to a great extent ignored concepts that are there has rather been increasing confusion in matters of hierarchy and political ideas. The state of CS organisation perhaps indicates this. For Cambodia, the delusion was perhaps that, after the violence and the Vietnamese occupation, there was a great weakness of political order, so that, through the 'noughties', CS organization was thought, politically, to be operating in a relative vacuum, when, analyses tend to show, it was not. To quote again Landau, things were "clear", by contrast with Vietnam.
Conclusions
The paper has argued that donor strategies in Vietnam and Cambodia show very different patterns of engagement with CS. In both cases, it makes sense to view these engagements as drawing donors into domestic politics. Further, the paper has argued that this means that it is analytically useful to view donors as part of local political processes. However, the paper also argues that donors tend to organise in ways that push them to assume that 'there is a King'. This is to do with how mainstream developmentalist thinking assumes that development is 'done', and marshals policy expertise that requires the existence of some agency to adopt and implement policy. That agency is usually assumed to be a local state. It therefore assumes, and wants to assume, that the political issues associated with the sovereignty question (as the paper understands it) have been resolved. 
